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Abstract 
The interwar period represents an era of emerging growth and 
maturity in Australian foreign and defence relations, with a 
distinct focus shift from Imperial to regional matters. However, 
this expression of independent policy has been largely 
overlooked in the existing literature. Rather, Australian policy 
makers of this era have been framed as disinterested in policy 
making, lacking direction and preferring ‘to deal with the world 
one step removed through Whitehall’. Such interpretations have 
overlooked significant policy changes throughout this period, 
painting Australia as a timid and naïve nation, content to follow 
Britain’s every policy and demand.  
 
This article will challenge such views, drawing upon a 
recent growth in literature that supports the notion of growing 
assertiveness in Australian foreign and defence policy 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In doing so, this article will 
seek to redefine the interwar image of Australia. This will be 
achieved through an examination of Australia’s response to the 
increasingly doubtful diplomatic and security assurances it 
received from Britain throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The 
uncertainty that this created forced Australian policy makers to 
assess their previously unchallenged commitment to the British 
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Empire and to consider the growing significance of Australia’s 
direct region in policy making, ultimately finding that the 
pursuit of a new policy direction was necessary. This article will 
examine this new assertiveness in policy making within the 
context of appeasement and rearmament, explicitly in its 
relation towards the potential regional aggressor Japan.  
 
This paper has been peer reviewed. 
The interwar period represents an era of emerging growth and 
maturity in Australian foreign and defence relations, with a 
distinct shift from Imperial to regional matters.
1
 This shift 
towards regionalism came largely as a result of increasing doubt 
in the diplomatic and security assurances Australia received 
from Britain, emerging during the 1920s and intensifying 
throughout the 1930s, and the rapidly changing world order in 
which Australian policy makers were forced to assess their 
reliance upon the British Empire. However, when surveying the 
scholarship dealing with this period, Australia’s emerging 
independence in policy making is largely overlooked. Rather, 
there is a dominant view in which Australia’s isolation, small 
population and limited defence capabilities see it deemed a 
nation whose power upon the international stage was trivial and 
whose foreign policy was slow to develop. According to this 
interpretation, Australian policy makers have been framed as 
                                                 
1 Australia’s direct region encompasses principally those nations within the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans, spanning from Indonesia in Southeast Asia up to Japan in East Asia. To 
indicate this region, terms Far East and Pacific will be used interchangeably throughout 
this paper, for it was the Far East to the British, and called so by Australia despite being 
the Near North geographically. 
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lacking any independent policy direction and, moreover, 
disinterested in such matters. Eric Andrews reinforces this with 
his argument that Australia, still a young nation, lacked the 
interest or skills needed to develop and coordinate its own 
policy measures. This disinterest and inexperience, Andrews 
suggests, saw the Australian Government adopt ‘few policies or 
ideas of its own’, content to keep Australia removed entirely 
from the decision making process by following those polices 
outlined by the United Kingdom Government.
2
 The ongoing 
influence of such views can be identified in Christopher Waters’ 
Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the 
Origins of World War II, which, written more than three decades 
after Andrews’ work, concludes that, ‘[d]uring the interwar era 
Australia did not have its own foreign policy but dealt with the 
world one step removed through Whitehall.’3 Such perspectives 
                                                 
2
 E. M. Andrews, Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the 
European Crisis, 1935-1939 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1970), 3-6, 25; E. M. Andrews, A History of Australian Foreign Policy: From 
Dependence to Independence (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire Pty. Ltd., 1979), 
70; E.M. Andrews, The Writing on the Wall: The British Commonwealth and 
Aggression in the East, 1931-1935 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 24-5.  
3
 C. Waters, Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the 
Origins of World War II (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2012), 7. 
Admittedly, Waters recognises Australia’s growing contribution to foreign 
policy, however, this contribution is limited to Empire policy and European 
events, such as the appeasement of European aggressors. Such an approach tends 
to prioritise Imperial policy above Australia’s own national interests, 
overlooking key region specific events such as the Gepp Mission and 
Manchurian Crisis. Such an approach limits Australian foreign and defence 
policy interests to the Imperial sphere, overlooking the weight that regional 
concerns played in the nation’s policy making. As such it cannot be seem to truly 
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have seen historians disregard significant events and policy 
changes throughout the period under study, painting Australia as 
a timid and naïve nation whose policy makers, rather than take 
independent action, were committed to Britain and the Empire 
regardless of the limitations and varying suitability of this 
framework.  
In more recent years there has been a new growth of 
literature supporting the notion of an emerging independence 
and regional focus in Australia’s interwar policies. Scholars 
such as David S. Bird, in J. A. Lyons – the ‘Tame Tasmanian’: 
Appeasement and Rearmament in Australia, 1932-39, and C. 
Bride and B. Attard’s edited collection of essays, Between 
Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from 
Federation until the Second World War, provide a varied and 
critical analysis of Australian foreign and defence policy, 
recognising the emergence of a more independent policy and the 
complexity of balancing both Empire and regional interests.
4
 
This paper will support such interpretations, seeking to 
challenge the dominant historical view and highlight Australia’s 
                                                                                             
support the notion of an independent Australian policy approach. See Australia 
and Appeasement, particularly Chapters 3, 4 and 6. 
4
 See David S. Bird, J. A. Lyons – the ‘Tame Tasmanian’: Appeasement and 
Rearmament in Australia, 1932-39 (North Melbourne: Australia Scholarly 
Publishing, 2009); eds. C. Bridge, and B. Attard, Between Empire and Nation: 
Australia’s External Relations from Federation until the Second World War 
(Kew: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000). See also, J. B. O'Brien, “Empire 
v. National Interests in Australian-British Relations during the 1930s.” Historical 
Studies 22(89) (1987): 569-86; A. T. Ross, Armed and Ready: The Industrial 
Development and Defence of Australia, 1900-1945 (Wahroonga: Turton and 
Armstrong, 1995).  
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shift to greater assertiveness and regionalism during this era. 
This article will do so through an examination of the two 
defining and interrelated policies of the interwar period, 
appeasement and rearmament, and the manner in which 
Australia’s new assertiveness and region specific policy was 
imbued within them.
5
  
Australia’s growing independence in policy making during 
the interwar period is illustrated most explicitly in its relations 
with Japan, as the nation’s policy makers sought to stabilise and 
strengthen relations with their ever uncertain neighbour. This 
diplomatic assertiveness came in direct response to fears for 
Britain’s waning power and absence of foreign policy planning 
for the Pacific. The first distinct indicator of such came at the 
Washington Naval Conference of 1921/22, at which Britain 
agreed to the Five Power Treaty, comprising of Britain, France, 
the US, Japan, and Italy. This was specifically a naval treaty 
which saw agreements made on disarmament, heavy limitations 
placed upon the tonnage of new capital ships and the 
consequential need to scrap approximately 40 per cent of 
previously existing ships to meet the treaty restrictions.
6
 This 
ratio, John McCarthy notes, was in Japan’s favour in terms of 
areas of concern, with Britain having interests in the Pacific, 
                                                 
5
 Appeasement being the idea that potentially aggressive nations can be pacified 
through diplomatic actions. 
6
 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations Since 1788 
(Botany: Australian National University Press, 1991), 97; J. McCarthy, Australia 
and Imperial Defence 1918-39: A Study in Air and Sea Power (St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland, 1976), 11. 
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Atlantic and Indian Oceans, whilst Japan’s sole region of 
concern was the Pacific.
7
 Additionally, the Washington 
Conference saw the Anglo-Japanese Alliance end in preference 
of a Four Power Pact – comprised of Japan, the United States, 
Britain and France.
8
 These agreements were based upon the ten 
year rule, whereby it was assumed that the peace established at 
Versailles in 1919 would ensure that no major international 
conflict would eventuate within the next ten years.
9
 However, 
this assumption was not one that Australia necessarily shared.
10
  
For Australia, who had long harboured fears that Japan 
would pursue an expansionist policy within the Pacific, the 
agreements made at Washington were detrimental, primarily 
because Japan and Australia no longer shared an ally in Britain, 
leaving no diplomatic advantage against possible Japanese 
expansion or aggression.
11
 Moreover, following the end of the 
First World War, Japan had emerged as the third largest naval 
power in the world, and Australian and Japanese territorial 
interests were brought closer with the redistribution of forfeited 
German colonies seeing Australia gain mandate over New 
Guinea, and Japan granted the Shandong and Jiaozhou Bay 
                                                 
7
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 11.  
8
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 11.  
9
 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Fontana, 
1991), 328; C. K. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against 
Germany 1939-45, Vol. IV (London: H.M.S.O., 1961), 84.  
10
 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 328; C. K. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic 
Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-45, Vol. 4 (London: H.M.S.O., 1961), 84. 
11
 C. Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 10.  
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territories. If Japan were to adopt a policy of regional expansion, 
Australia saw itself as a likely target.
12
 Accordingly, Australia 
was simply not willing to trust the assumptions of a sedated 
Japan.
13
 In light of this, the Washington Conference brought 
with it a changing world order, one in which Empire power was 
being redefined, and so too Australia’s previously secure and 
relatively uncompromised world view.
14
  
Australia’s growing doubt in British foreign and defence 
planning was evident as key Australian figures began to 
realistically evaluate the Four Power Pact. For instance, Prime 
Minister William Hughes concluded that the Four Power Pact 
provided merely a loose security agreement which was not 
backed by force and, therefore, unable to guarantee against an 
attack.
15
 It appeared that Britain’s commitment to and strategic 
planning for Australia’s immediate region was inadequate. As 
such, the nation would need to pursue a policy that secured its 
national interests.  
Initially little was done in attempts to pursue such policy, 
however, 1931 would change this.
16
 In September 1931, the 
                                                 
12
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 7-8; M. Tate and F. Foy, “More 
Light on the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,” Political Science 
Quarterly 74(4) 1959: 535-6.  
13
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 8.  
14
 C. Bridge and B. Attard, “Introduction,” in Between Empire and Nation, 1.  
15
 Penang Conference Report, March 1921. TNA: ADM 11-3165.  
16
 This lack of action by Australia throughout the 1920s can in part be attributed 
to the ongoing process of recovery following the First World War and the advent 
of the Great Depression.  
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Japanese military invaded the Chinese province of Manchuria, 
eventually establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo.
17
 
Through the Manchurian Crisis, it became apparent that Japan 
was an aggressive, expansionist power with the potential to 
disrupt the regional order, and the need for Australia to establish 
its own region-specific foreign policy became irrefutable. It was 
to be a policy of appeasement, seeking to conciliate Japan and 
encourage regional stability.  
Having violated the League of Nations covenant, Japan 
faced sanctions, primarily economic, as a means of discouraging 
any further aggressive behaviour.
18
 Australia rejected such 
sanctions on the grounds of trade and regional stability. At this 
point, the world was at the height of the Great Depression and 
Japanese trade was crucial for Australia’s economic survival 
with Japan taking almost one quarter of Australian wool in 
1931/32. Australia had no wish to see sanctions imposed that 
would threaten this trade relationship.
19
 Moreover, Australia 
feared that such actions by the League would antagonise Japan, 
further threatening the security of the Pacific region if Japan 
were to react aggressively.
20
 Australia, unwilling to support the 
course of the League, lobbied in London to avoid sanctions, and 
in turn sought to ensure British policy mirrored its regional 
                                                 
17
 Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 37; Millar, Peace and War, 55.  
18
 E.M. Andrews, “The Australian Government and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-
34,” Australian Outlook, 35(3) (1981):307-8. 
19
 Andrews, “The Manchurian Crisis,” 310; Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 40; 
Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 37-8, 77.  
20
 Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 40.  
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interests.
21
 This position is reflected in the comments of 
Attorney General, John Latham, to Australian High 
Commissioner in London, Stanley Bruce: 
We agree that economic sanctions should not be applied or even 
considered by the Commonwealth Government…We are 
anxious not to adopt at any stage any attitude which might 
commit us to any participation in military etc. action on account 
of a quarrel between China and Japan in respect to Manchuria. 
This should be the guiding principle.
22
 
Australia was able to resist sanctions, with Britain also 
wishing to avoid sanctions and any potential for further 
‘difficulties’ with Japan.23 Australia, however, was unable to 
convince Britain to adopt its diplomatic agenda, Britain having 
committed to the League policy of non-recognition of 
Manchukuo, a policy the Australian Government would never 
adopt.
24
 With non-recognition abolishing any hope of stabilising 
Anglo-Japanese relations and Australia’s regional position, 
Australian policy makers were driven to seek a more active role 
in policy making and a more concerted attempt at regional 
appeasement, embodied in the 1934 Australian Eastern Mission 
visit to Japan.  
                                                 
21
 Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 37.  
22
 Australian Eastern Mission, 3 July 1934. NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 17 (emphasis 
added). 
23
 Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 75.  
24
 Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 37. 
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The Mission, led by Latham, now Minister for External 
Affairs, was the first of its kind for Australia and was integral in 
the nation’s reassessment of regional interests and diplomatic 
approaches to security in its positon within the Pacific.
25
 Latham 
visited a number of countries in the region. Japan, however, was 
the primary interest of the mission, as Ruth Megaw suggests 
‘[t]he rest of the Mission was peripheral to what was to take 
place there.’26 Latham stressed Australia’s geographical 
closeness to the Pacific and need for greater diplomacy there:
 
 
[I]t is important to endeavour to develop and improve our 
relations with our near neighbours, whose fortunes are so 
important to us, not only in economic matters, but also in 
relation to vital issues of peace and war…If war takes place 
there on a major scale, it is bound to affect Australia 
profoundly, whether or not the Commonwealth is actually 
engaged in that conflict. The whole of our interests, therefore, 
lie in doing everything in our power to prevent the risk of war 
in the East from becoming a pulsing reality.
27
 
The Mission was executed at a strategically important time 
when Japan, due to the Manchurian Crisis, was isolated within 
the international community and seeking friendship, particularly 
                                                 
25
 I. Nish “Relations with Japan,” in Between Empire and Nation, 132; R. 
Megaw, “The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East in 1934: Its 
Significance in the Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy,” Journal of the Royal 
Australian Historical Society 59(4) (1973):249-50.  
26
 Millar, Peace and War, 38-9; Megaw, “Australian Goodwill Mission,” 250. 
27
 Australian Eastern Mission, Confidential Report on trade between Australia 
and Japan, 1934. NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16. 
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within its direct region.
28
 Accordingly, Latham used the 
Mission, particularly a meeting with Japanese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Kōki Hirota, as an opportunity to determine the 
future of Manchuria and convince Japan to re-join the League of 
Nations, Japan having announced its decision to leave by 
1935.
29
 It was urgent that Australia keep Japan within the folds 
of the League and the international peace it sought to maintain, 
for it was the only means available to constrain nations and 
hopefully maintain regional and global stability.
 
The emphasis 
that Australian policy makers placed upon the Mission is evident 
in Latham’s secret report. Unlike the public report, this report 
provides a deeper examination of regional concerns and 
highlights Australia’s rigid commitment to appeasing Japan, 
going so far as to openly reject the League and by association 
British policy towards Manchuria:  
It appears to me that the policy of non-recognition of 
Manchukuo is going to meet increasingly greater difficulties as 
time passes. So far as one can judge there is not the slightest 
probability that Manchukuo will cease to exist… 
[C]onsiderations should be given to the possibility of 
discovering some formula which would enable Japan and the 
League to “save face” and get rid of themselves what threatens 
to be a permanent source of poison in relations between Japan 
and other counties. It is improbable that any conceivable 
                                                 
28
 Nish, “Relations with Japan,” 132.  
29
 Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 25-6, 61; Megaw, “Australian Goodwill Mission,” 
250. 
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formula would satisfy any of the Chinese factors, but that could 
not be helped.
30
 
Despite the vagueness of this alleged ‘formula’, Latham’s 
emphasis on pursuing a policy of appeasement towards Japan, 
despite contradicting both the League and Britain, is evident. 
Subsequently, Australia’s emerging assertiveness in foreign 
policy is irrefutable.  
Historically the diplomatic significance of the Australian 
Eastern Mission has been recognised. However, it has been 
overshadowed by its apparent ineffectiveness in the broader 
policy aims of appeasement. For instance Megaw, whose 1973 
article is widely accepted as the conclusive evaluation of the 
Mission, argues that while ‘splendidly successful’ and 
‘innovatory’ in terms of greater initiative in Australian foreign 
policy, the immediate and long-term significance of the Mission 
are ‘harder to assess.’31 Such a conclusion is based upon the 
failure to convince Japan to remain within the League and 
Australia’s apparent reluctance to make any definite 
commitments during the Mission.
32
 This is not necessarily so. 
The Mission was integral in strengthening Australian-Japanese 
trade relations, and in turn, encouraging goodwill between the 
two nations.  
                                                 
30
 Australian Eastern Mission, 3 July 1934. NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 17 (Emphasis 
added). 
31
 Megaw, “Australian Goodwill Mission,” 254, 259.  
32
 Megaw, “Australian Goodwill Mission,” 257-9. 
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In his report on the Mission, Latham emphasised the 
potential trade market in Japan and the role it could play in 
fostering goodwill between the two nations. By 1934 Japan was 
Australia’s number two trade partner, second only to Britain, 
and Australia was ranked eighth for Japan. In the year 1932/33 
Japan purchased over £11.5 million in goods from Australia, 
whilst Australia purchased some £3.5 million in return. This, 
Latham pointed out, was a ratio of almost 3.5:1. Although a very 
favourable trade balance for Australia, he encouraged Australia 
to sell to and buy more from Japan to ensure this favourable 
trade relationship remained sustainable.
33
 One means of 
enhancing this pre-existing trade relationship was through the 
implementation of the 1933 Trade Commissioner Act in Japan. 
Aside from providing stronger trade relations with Japan, a 
Trade Commissioner would play an inherently diplomatic role 
as a representative of Australian goodwill.
34
 Accordingly, in 
1935 Longfield Lloyd was appointed as the first Trade 
Commissioner in Tokyo, ensuring a means of constant contact 
with Japan and the continued representation of Australian 
diplomacy.
35
  
The Mission also saw Japan carry out a reciprocal 
goodwill mission to Australia in 1935, at which Latham publicly 
stated, 
                                                 
33
 The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of Latham. NAA: A981, Far 5 
Part 16. 
34
 The Australian Eastern Mission, 1934: Report of Latham. NAA: A981, Far 5 
Part 16. 
35
 Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 25-6; Megaw, “Australian Goodwill Mission,” 254-5. 
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[I]t was all the more important that Australians should look 
individually towards the establishment of friendly relations with 
the nations in which they were most interested. We cannot leave 
all our relations with other countries…Australia and Japan 
hold largely in their hands the destiny of the Pacific.
36
 
As Ian Nish suggests, this statement implies criticism of 
British policies towards Japan whilst also highlighting 
Australia’s commitment to an independent regional foreign 
policy.
37
 These events, although not ground-breaking in terms of 
diplomatic relations, highlight Australia’s concerted bid to 
encourage goodwill in Australian-Japanese relations, and in turn 
preserve regional security through conciliating a potentially 
aggressive regional power. Ultimately, Australian policy makers 
were seeking to establish relations that would ensure Australia’s 
regional security when Britain could not.  
Aside from the growing assertiveness in Australian 
foreign policy during the interwar period, defence planning 
during this period also adopted a more independent approach. 
Similar to the diplomatic policies Australia carried out, the 
nation’s defence policies also emerged in direct response to 
ongoing concerns surrounding Imperial overstretching and an 
inadequate commitment to strategic planning for the Pacific.  
Throughout the 1920s, the Singapore Naval Base had been 
the primary Imperial strategy for defence in the Pacific, and the 
                                                 
36
 The Times, September, 1935, 10.  
37
 Nish, “Relations with Japan,” 133.  
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cornerstone for Australia’s own defence planning.38 The so-
called Singapore Strategy planned for the main British fleet to 
be situated at Singapore, blocking Japan’s access to Australia’s 
eastern coastline, as well as protecting the lines of 
communication between Singapore and Britain via the Suez 
Canal.
39
 In theory, this would allow two zones of conflict to be 
addressed: Europe and the Far East.
40
 However, the plans for the 
base were vague, as was Britain’s commitment. As early as 
1921 key figures in Australian political circles began to question 
the logistics of the Singapore Strategy. These included Rear 
Admiral Sir Percy Grant, Commander-in-Chief for the Australia 
Station and Advisor on Defence to the Prime Minister, who 
pointed out the weaknesses of Singapore, noting the 
vulnerability of its long lines of communication.
41
 In 1923, 
Bruce, then Prime Minister, expressed his concerns: ‘I’m not 
quite as clear as I should like to be as to how the protection of 
Singapore is to be done.’42  
                                                 
38
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 44.  
39
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 44-5.  
40
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 9, 40; The necessity to prepare for 
a two zone conflict became increasingly apparent throughout the early 1930s, as 
the increasing influence of the Nazi regime in Germany, and the fascist 
governments in Spain and Italy, all but confirmed the likelihood of a European 
war. Similarly, Japan’s increasing aggression, most notably Japan’s July 1937 
invasion of China proper, which signalled the start of the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, Japan’s policy of regional expansion and established the Pacific as a theatre 
of war.  
41
 Penang Conference Report, March 1921. TNA: ADM, 116/3100.  
42
 Waters, Australia and Appeasement, 246; McCarthy, Australia and Imperial 
Defence, 47.  
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This vagueness in policy planning was in part due to the 
ten year rule and Britain’s confidence in the League. However, 
it was also due largely to Britain’s experience of Imperial 
overstretching and waning defensive capabilities. In the 
aftermath of the First World War, Whitehall was facing 
immense national debt due to wartime borrowing.
43
 Moreover, 
British society, and the world as a whole, still recovering from 
the economic, psychological and physical trauma of the war, 
largely rejected the prospect of any future conflict. Thus, in 
seeking to balance the government’s debt and satisfy British 
public opinion, Britain’s defence industries were the clear 
choice for economic reform.
44
 This saw the widespread 
cancellation of construction contracts and funds assigned to the 
Royal Navy dropped from £356 million in 1918/19, to £52 
million by 1923.
45
 The global economic slump that was the 
Great Depression placed further pressure upon the British 
Government, with greater calls for social services to combat 
raging unemployment levels.
46
 Thus, not only was Britain 
uninterested in carrying out defence planning, but simply 
incapable of doing so.  
Contributing further to Australia’s doubt in Britain’s 
defence planning was the apparent fragmentation of the Empire 
throughout the 1920s. Firstly, there was the 1922 Chanak Crisis 
that saw Turkish troops violate the peace agreement in Turkey, 
                                                 
43
 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 319.  
44
 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 320-1.  
45
 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 323. 
46
 McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 50; Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 321. 
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attacking and defeating Greek forces in Izmir and storming 
Constantinople. This very nearly brought Australia to war when 
Britain declared the Empire’s support for Greece and its 
commitment of armed forces.
47
 In 1925 the Locarno Treaties, 
which dealt with the division of borders and territories in 
Europe, came to dominate British policymaking. It appeared to 
Australian policy makers that British interests, and in turn the 
interests of its Empire, lay in Europe and decidedly outside 
Australia’s region.48 In 1926 came the Balfour Declaration. The 
declaration recognised the growing independence of the 
Dominions and the subsequent need to provide them with 
greater autonomy, giving them equality of status with Britain in 
terms of Empire relations.
49
 Far from dispelling Australian fears, 
the Balfour Declaration generated further anxiety and 
uncertainty. Given that the Empire was essential to Australia for 
international representation and security, there emerged 
concerns that the evolution of the roles of the Empire and 
Dominions would lead to a fracturing of the Empire and a loss 
of the common objectives that bound its members, leaving 
                                                 
47
 N. Meany, Australia and World Crisis, 1914-1923: Vol. 2, A History of 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-1923 (Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 2000), 508-9.  
48
 Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 6; R. Eccles, “Australian Perspectives and the Balfour 
Declaration of 1926,” in Dependency? Essays in the History of Australian 
Defence and Foreign Policy, ed. J. McCarthy (Canberra: University College, 
University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1989), 23, 
25-6. 
49
 Bird, Tame Tasmania, 6-7; Eccles, “Australian Perspectives," 23.  
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Australia without concerted policy objectives or the certainty of 
armed support from Britain and its Empire.
50
  
Despite this growing doubt in Britain’s commitments to 
the Pacific and its weakening defence capabilities, combined 
with the uncertain role of the Empire, Australia, suffering a 
similar fate to Britain in the depression, had little choice but to 
trust, although apprehensively, the assurances offered in the 
Singapore Strategy. The Manchurian Crisis would change this, 
revealing to Australian policy makers the weakness of the 
League of Nations as a structure for maintaining and negotiating 
international peace and Britain’s limited understanding of the 
fragility of the Far East. Andrews suggests, 1931 signified the 
beginning of crisis in the Pacific that would become the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937) and finally the Pacific War (1941).
51
 
As such, the need emerged for Australia to rearm specifically for 
its region. Rearmament was thus a companion to appeasement, 
for through appeasement Australia was able to postpone war and 
create time in which to prepare for the inevitable conflict.
52
  
                                                 
50
 Eccles, “Australian Perspectives,” 30. 
51
 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 433; Bird, 
Tame Tasmanian, 52; The Writing on the Wall, xii; Australian policy makers had 
voiced their doubt in the suitability of the League of Nations as a structure for 
international peace, Hughes having criticised it as weak from its very conception 
at the Versailles Peace Conference – 1931 was merely a confirmation of these 
fears; Andrews. 
52
 Bird, Tame Tasmanian, 31, 52-3. 
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By 1933 Australia was finally regaining some economic 
stability, that year marking the first post-Depression budget 
surplus.
53
 This increasing economic stability meant that 
Australia could begin to address concerns surrounding regional 
defence planning. In September, Minister for Defence, George 
Pearce, announced the formation of a Trust Account specifically 
for defence spending, to which the bulk of the budget surplus 
was to be allocated, allowing an estimated increase of defence 
spending by one third.
54
 The weight that Australia’s region-
specific concerns had in early rearmament measures is evident 
in the focus placed upon defending the nation’s immense and 
vulnerable coastlines.
55
 The Royal Australian Air Force became 
increasingly significant in the preparation for light raids, with 
Japan clearly in mind.
56
  
Australia also sought to assess the state of Imperial 
defence, in February 1934 inviting the Secretary to the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, Maurice Hankey to visit and 
report on both Australia and Imperial defence measures.
57
 
However, in the time between Hankey’s invitation and his 
arrival in October 1934, two key events further heightened 
Australia’s apprehension over Britain’s defence commitment to 
the Pacific. Firstly, the Australian Eastern Mission visited 
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Singapore, where Australia’s fears were confirmed with Latham 
labelling the base ‘chaotic’ and ‘without concentration’.58 
Secondly, the British Government downgraded the Pacific in 
terms of strategic priorities, seeing naval expenditure for the 
region decrease by some £26 million pounds in the following 
three years. The decision was also made to demote Singapore to 
a mere light naval craft base.
59
 Accordingly, an Australian 
Government who openly questioned Britain’s policy commit-
ments for the Pacific region greeted Hankey. Hankey sought to 
placate these fears.
60
 Hankey was highly critical of Australia’s 
invasion fears and preparation for such, deeming them ‘extreme’ 
conclusions.
61
 Rather, his report advocated the Blue Water 
Naval principal, considering the British Royal Navy supreme 
and ‘the shield of the whole Empire.’62 He also continually 
emphasised the significance of Singapore in attempts to dispel 
any fears surrounding security in the Pacific. Overall, Hankey’s 
report stressed the importance of symmetry between British and 
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Australian defence strategies, encouraging Australia to support 
the Imperial framework with a strong naval force.
63
  
The reception of Hankey’s report was mixed, with the 
Australian Royal Navy unsurprisingly embracing it, whilst 
others rejected it outright.
64
 Commandant of the Royal Military 
College, Lieutenant General Sir John Lavarack, criticised 
Hankey’s conclusions and British defensive deficiencies, 
stating, ‘Hankey’s views are out of date, since they do not 
sufficiently take into account the decline of the British sea 
power which has taken place since the war.’65  
In December 1935, the Joseph Lyons Government 
announced a new 1935-1937 defence development program, 
largely in reaction to events of 1934 and Hankey’s report. The 
program was essentially a compromise. It reflected Hankey’s 
emphasis upon sea power, with Australia continuing to 
contribute to the Royal Navy. However, it also saw Australia’s 
regional needs addressed with the RAAF receiving a new airport 
depot, four permanent squadrons and a number of new aircrafts. 
This allocation of new funds was vital as in 1934 the RAAF had 
consisted of only sixty-eight crafts, most of which were obsolete 
or mere trainers.
66
 The Australian armed forces received a noted 
increase in expenditure, almost doubling between the years 
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1934/35 and 1935/36, funds allocated to expanding and 
modernising coastal fortifications.
67
 Such actions on behalf of 
the Australian Government reflect the emergence of a more 
assertive, region centred approach to defence policy making.  
The year 1937 was pivotal in the development of 
Australian defence policy, with the events of this year 
highlighting to the nation’s policy makers the necessity of 
establishing a more intensive approach to defence that would 
ensure Australia’s national interests were secure. The first key 
indicator came at the 1937 Imperial Conference. Driven by 
ongoing doubt in Britain’s defence commitments for the Far 
East, the Australian delegation had arrived at the Conference 
with a list of defence questions for Britain, hoping to clarify 
exactly what support could be expected from Britain in the event 
of war.
68
 This direct approach evidences Australia’s growing 
assertiveness in its relations with Britain. Moreover, it shows 
foresight as the nation’s policy makers, aware of Britain’s 
declining defence capabilities, sought to assess Imperial defence 
policy. This insight could be used to plan Australian policy 
accordingly.
69
 Britain’s responses to Australia’s questions were 
discouraging. For instance, one issue which concerned Australia 
was the prospect of a two ocean conflict in which Britain would 
face both a European and a Pacific enemy. The Australian 
delegation asked for Britain’s strategic objectives in such a 
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context. Britain responded that, ‘[o]nce war with Japan has 
broken out, our policy must be governed by the consideration 
that, until the issue with Germany has been settled, we cannot 
count on being able to support anything more than a defensive 
policy in the Far East.’70 Contributing further to Australia’s 
apprehension was the revelation that the passage of time for the 
Royal Fleet to arrive at Singapore had been increased from sixty 
to seventy days.
71
 Throughout the 1930s, particularly following 
1936 when Nazi Germany began open rearmament, the majority 
of Britain’s attention had been upon the increasing volatility of 
the situation in Europe and how to respond to the enemies 
within its direct region. As such, in the case of a two ocean war, 
Europe was the priority as was made clear by Britain: ‘a very 
considerable period may elapse before the progress of our 
operations against Germany and the redistribution of our forces 
permit of a fleet arriving in the Far East.’72 This statement was 
an early indicter of what would later become the “Beat Hitler 
First” policy, and it left Australia to face an uncertain future in 
the Pacific.  
There was further cause for Australian apprehension 
during the events of the Conference. Lyons had arrived with a 
plan for regional-centred diplomacy and security, the Pacific 
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Pact. The Pact was based upon a broad vision of regional 
understanding and non-aggression. This idea of non-aggression, 
in theory, provided an assurance of peace and mutual 
understanding between the signatory nations.
73
 Moreover, it 
sought to include the United States, suggesting that Lyons’ 
hoped to secure US interest in the Pacific and a potential ally in 
the event of Japanese aggression. However, the proposed Pacific 
Pact was a failure. Australia faced middling enthusiasm from the 
conference attendees and tension between Japan, Britain, and 
the US made it difficult to get key nations onside. The proposal 
was handed over to Britain to consider and, ultimately, laid 
aside, leaving policy makers to agonise over Australia’s future 
in the region.
74
 
The 1937 Imperial Conference had revealed the grim 
reality that Britain could no longer protect its Empire. Adding to 
Australia’s sense of insecurity was the rising threat of war in its 
direct region, which was confirmed on 7 July 1937 when 
Japanese troops invaded China proper. This signalled the start of 
the Second Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s policy of regional 
expansion.
75
 The risk for Australia was that Japan would now 
drive south, ever closer to its territory at a time when Britain 
was preoccupied in Europe and unable to offer aid.  
Australia’s response to the events of 1937 was to intensify 
rearmament measures in preparation for a conflict in its direct 
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region. In August 1937, shortly after his return from the 
Conference, the Lyons Government announced a new 
rearmament program, one that saw a dramatic increase in 
defence expenditure, leading to deficit spending on defence for 
the first time since the First World War, with overall 
commitments for the next three years exceeding £16 million 
pounds.
76
 The program had an explicit focus upon local defence, 
with the purchase of three harbour defence vessels and a naval 
base being developed in Darwin as an auxiliary base to 
Singapore.
77
 The RAAF, who, as previously mentioned had 
come to hold increasing importance in the protection of 
Australia’s coastlines, received the bulk of the expenditure and 
began a program of infrastructure development, with bases and 
stations being established all over Australia, whilst the army was 
to receive funding to equip a private military firm garrison in 
Darwin.
78
 The hope was that Australia could ensure greater self-
sufficiency and defend home territories in the event of an attack. 
Thus, in light of the revelations of the 1937 Imperial 
Conference, and Japan’s increasing aggression within the 
Pacific, Australia actively pursued an independent defence 
policy, one that explicitly reflected its regional concerns.
79
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Ultimately, as McCarthy argues, this was the point at which 
Australia had to break away from a policy of dependence and 
seek self-reliance as Britain, although still a most valued ally 
could no longer be a protector.
80
 
Australia’s defence and foreign policy throughout the 
interwar period inarguably reflects a shift towards greater 
independence and regional awareness, a shift made necessary by 
problems of Empire, as Australian policy makers, recognising 
Britain’s ongoing ill preparedness and diverging regional 
interests, looked to themselves for salvation. Ultimately, this 
shows foresight on behalf of Australian policy makers as they 
recognised an impending war and sought to balance region 
specific appeasement and defensive policy in a bid to placate 
Japan and prepare the nation for war.  
The arguments and evidence put forward by this article 
show that the period under study represents a fundamental point 
in the development of Australia’s early foreign and defence 
policy. This period represents the emergence of a thoughtful and 
proactive nation deeply invested in the outcomes of international 
affairs, rather than, as the traditional views would have us 
believe, one disinterested in such affairs. 
  
                                                                                             
establishing its own diplomatic ties which spoke directly to its needs and 
regional concerns. 
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